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ALLOCATION OF SECURITIES IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS: CLAIMS MEASUREMENT THROUGH
INVESTMENT VALUE ANALYSIS
BEGINNING with Los Angeles Lumber in 1939, the Supreme Court in a series
of reorganization cases 1 has brought the Boyd 2 doctrine to full flower. As
developed by the Court, Boyd now commands three basic canons: (1) The
capitalization of the reorganized enterprise, as in any newly formed corpora-
tion, must be limited to the reasonable value of its assets, usually determined
by capitalizing its future earnings.3 In a reorganization context, this limita-
tion restrains over-optimistic reliance on debt financing, with its danger of
future default. (2) The new security structure must be "feasible": the future
burden of fixed charges, the schedule of debt maturities, and other features
of the capital framework must be geared to expected income fluctuations in
order to minimize the risk of default.4 Moreover, voting control must be
based on substantial equity holdings.5 And in the case of utilities, the
1. (1) Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1939) ; noted,
e.g., 49 YALE L. J. 1099 (1940.). An extended discussion appears in Dodd, The Los
Angeles Lumber Products Case and Its Implications, 53 HARv. L. Rav. 713 (1940). (2)
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-1 (1941), discussed in Com-
ment, Distribution of Securities In Corporate Reorganization, 51 YALE L. J. 85 (1941).
(3) Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co.,
318 U.S. 523, 542 (1943) and Ecker v. Western Pacific Railroad Corp., 318 U.S. 448,
515 (1943). These cases, decided the same day, are analyzed in Swaine, A Decade Of
Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 Of The Bankruptcy Act, 56 HAnv. L. R.v.
1037-58; 1193-1224 (1943).
2. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). See dicta pages of
cases cited in note I supra for repeated references to the Boyd rule. For pre-Los Angeles
Lumber comment on Boyd, see Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Re-
organization: Chapters X and XI Of The Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939).
3. Consolidated Rock Products v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-6 (1941); Ecker v.
Western Pacific Railroad Corporation, 318 U.S. 448, 477, 483 (1943) ; Group of Institu-
tional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 523,
541 (1943). See Field, Valtation for the Purposes of Corporate Reorganization, 16
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 13 (1943) ; I DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORrORATIONS 296 (4th
ed. 1946) ; I BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 253-7 (1st ed. 1937). Cf. BALLANTIxr,
COaPORATIONS 798 (rev. ed. 1946). But cf. valuations based on market value for portfolio
assets of investment companies. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951).
4. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 526, 530-1 (1941) ; Group
of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad Co., 318
U.S. 523, 544-5 (1943).
5. Ecker v. Western Pacific Railroad Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 481 (1943). Cf. "Excessive
voting power in proportion to financial interest in the company and control with a dispro.
portionately small investment are the very evils which the ... [Public Utility Holding
Company Act] is designed to correct." Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893
(1941).
ALLOCATION OF SECURITIES
special public interest in their financial stability may justify diverting some
future income from junior interests to capital improvement and betterment
funds.6 (3) Given the size and structure of the new capitalization, new securi-
ties must be allocated among investors in the old enterprise in the order of
their contractual priority.
But "absolute priority" does not demand that new capital structures pre-
serve the form of old priorities. Instead, each class must be "fully" compen-
sated for priorities which "feasibility" requires to be surrendered., To allocate
new securities, "the claim" of each class is measured by valuing its investment
contract rights. This measurement must consider "the entire bundle of
rights" provided in the investor's old contract, more recently, the contract's
"investment value." s Thus, only if all prior classes have received the full
"equitable equivalent" of relinquished rights may junior security holders
participate at all.9 Otherwise their claims are "worthless," and they must be
eliminated from the plan.' 0
This Comment explores the criteria utilized in measuring investor claims to
determine their participation in reorganizaton plans.
CLAIMS MEASUREMENT IN CHAPTER X REORGANIZATIONS
Chapter X (formerly § 77B) of the Bankruptcy Act governs reorganiza-
tions of insolvent non-railroad corporations." This legislation defined new
reorganization procedures to replace equity receiverships;12 "fair and equit-
6. E.g. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 523, 566-8 (1943).
7. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 528-31 (1941).
8. SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 129 (1949); Niagara Hudson
Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336, 341 (1951). These cases arose under § 11 of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act. However, in the latter case the Court said:
"[W]e find no lack of authority in analogous fields of reorganization for sustaining the
general principle that a class of securities may go unrecognized in a reorganization when
informed estimates of future earnings indicate that they have no investment value."
[Citing Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Rail-
road Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943) (§ 77) and Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois, 312
U.S. 510 (1941) (§77B)]. Id. at 347-8
9. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Rail-
road Co., 318 U.S. 523, 565 (1943).
10. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 303 U.S. 106, 123-3 (1939); Group
of Institutional Investors %% Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 318
U.S. 523, 541-2 (1943).
11. §77B: 48 STAT. 912 (1934). Chapter X: 52 STAT. 911 (193S), 11 U.S.C. § 276
(1946). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act is the "composition" section, available to small
non-publicly held corporations. See SEC v. United States Realty Co., 309 U.S. 434
(1940). For a discussion of Chapter 11 procedures and the initial uncertainty about its
coverage, see Rostow & Cutler, supra note 2.
12. Id. at 1335 et scq.
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able," the statutory guide to securities allocation, was left undefined. In Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., however, the Supreme Court read
"fair and equitable" as "words of art" with a "fixed meaning" developed in
equity receiverships: "absolute priority."13
In Los Angeles Limber, arising under § 77B, the debtor had initiated pro-
ceedings by filing a voluntary petition in 1936. One bond and two stock
classes were outstanding: (1) 6% when-earned first mortgage bonds (to
mature in 1944) ; (2) class A common; (3) class B common. 14 The proposed
plan called for cancellation of the old debt securities and issuance of new 5o
preferred and common-both of $1 par and with voting rights.15 Aggregate
par value of new stocks issued to old security holders equaled $830,000-the
estimated value of the assets.16 Although bondholders' claim to principal and
interest totaled $3,807,071.88, the plan gave them preferred shares with an
aggregate par of $641,375.1" Class A common received 188,625 shares of
new common; Class B common was wiped out.'8 Thus, common was to
receive 23%o of the assets and voting power of the new company even though
the debtor's total assets, as valued for purposes of the case, were less than
one fourth the face amount of the bondholders' claim. The Court held that the
plan, as a matter of law, did not pass the "fair and equitable" test :1 unless
the value of the corporation's assets exceeded creditors' claims, stockholders
13. 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939).
14. The debtor was a holding company. Only one of six wholly owned subsidiaries,
Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation, had assets of sizeable value. The
debtor's mortgage bonds were issued in 1924 and had a first lien on both the fixed assets
of this subsidiary and the capital stock of all the subsidiaries. Interest payments on the
bonds had stopped on February 1, 1929. A voluntary reorganization in 1930 reduced the
interest rate from 7 % to 6% and made it contingent on earnings. The debtor's old
stock was cancelled and new Class A and Class B common issued. Class A went to old
shareholders who contributed $400,000 for working capital. Thus, Class A was given
preference to $400,000 and interest over Class B in case of liquidation. Class B stock
went to bondholders in payment of unpaid interest charges. Id. at 109-10.
15. Preferred was to be non-cumulative. After receiving a 5% dividend, common would
be entitled to a similar dividend. Then both classes would participate equally in the remain-
ing dividends. Similarly, preferred was to have a liquidation preference (par). And after
common received the same amount, both classes would participate equally in the remaining
assets. Id. at 111.
16. This amount "equals the going concern value of the assets of the enterprise,"
Ibid. The sum consisted of $430,000 in fixed assets and approximately $400,000 in
current assets. Id. at 109. However, the Court did not indicate the method of valuing
the fixed assets. Later decisions made capitalized future earnings the essential measure.
See note 3 supra and text.
17. Each old bond would be exchanged for 250 preferred shares. 92.81% of the face
amount of bonds assented to the plan. Meanwhile, 170,000 preferred shares were reserved
for sale to raise money for rehabilitating the shipyards. 308 U.S. at 111.
18. No new contribution was required of Class A stockholders. Ibid.
19. Id. at 114.
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-in the absence of a new contribution in money or money's worth-forfeited
the right to participate.2 0
Thus the Los Angeles Lumnber decision held that when the value of assets
($830,000) fell far below the face amount of debt claims ($3,807,071.8S), no
equity was left for shareholders. Because bondholders' face claims exceeded
asset values the court had no reason to look beyond face amounts in measuring
bond claims. And despite the bonds' 1944 maturity date, the Court considered
them matured for measurement purposes.
The unanimous decision in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois '
spelled out the Supreme Court's notion of "absolute priority." Consolidated Rock
Products Company (Consolidated) and its two wholly owned subsidiaries-
Union Rock (Union) and Consumers Rock and Gravel (Consumers)-
sought reorganization under § 77B. 22 Four security classes were outstanding:
(1) Union 6% mortgage bonds; (2) Consumers 6% mortgage bonds; (3)
Consolidated no-par preferred; (4) Consolidated no-par common.2 The plan
contemplated consolidating the three companies and replacing the old securi-
ties with 5 % cumulative mortage income bonds, 5% preferred, common and
stock warrants. 4  It met 50% of both Union and Consumers bondholders'
20. The Court rejected shareholders' financial standing, community influence, and
advantages of management continuity as contributions warranting participation. "Such
items are illustrative of a host of intangibles which, if recognized as adequate considera-
tion for issuance of stock to valueless junior interests, would serve as easy evasions of
the principle of full ... priority." Id. at 122. The Court also rejected: (1) Shareholders'
waiver of the right to control the property till 1944 (maturity date of bonds), id. at 127;
(2) Shareholders' waiver of ability to litigate their claims, absent bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion, id. at 131; (3) Probability that bondholders in event of foreclosure would receive
substantially less than the appraised value of the assets, id. at 123.
21. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
22. Id. at 514.
23. The face claim of publicly-held Union bonds totalled $2,280,555 (principal
$1,877,000; accrued interest $403,555). Union's property secured the issue. Face claim
of publicly-held Consumers bonds equalled $1,358,715 (principal $1,137,000; accrued
interest $221,715). Consumers property secured this issue. Preferred's liquidation claim
was $25 per share plus accrued dividends. 285,947 preferred shares and 397,455 common
shares were outstanding. Id. at 514-5.
24. Bonds and preferred were to be divided into two series, one for Consumers and
the other for Union bondholders. The new bonds would mature in 20 years; interest
would be cumulative. Each bond and preferred stock series was entitled to a sinking
fund. After bond interest and sinking fund payments, dividends could be declared on pre-
ferred. However, dividends would be non-cumulative until retirement of the same bond
series except to the e.\-tent that net income is available for dividends. After bond
retirement, preferred would be fully cumulative.
Stock warrants were of two types: (1) Each preferred share was given a warrant
for the purchase of new common at prices ranging from $2 to $ 6 per share-depending
on when exercised; (2) Warrants given to old common (one warrant for each five shares
of common) entitled the holder to purchase one new common share for $1 within three
months of issuance. Id. at 515-6.
Normally, preferred shareholders would elect 4 out of 9 directors and common the
remainder. And old preferred would receive most of the new common, even if all
19521
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principal claim with income bonds, the other half with preferred. Bond-
holders' claims to accrued interest were to be extinguished. Preferred would
receive new common on a one for one basis; old common would be given
stock warrants. Net income of the new company was to be divided into two
equal parts, one to service the new securities issued to Consumers bond-
holders and the other to service those issued to Union bondholders.
20
The Court held the plan not "fair and equitable." The plan failed to treat
accrued bond interest on the same basis as the claim to principal; bondholders
were to relinquish a 6% fixed-interest claim for a 5% contingent claim in
inferior securities; and their maturities were partly extended and partly elimin-
inated. Thus, bondholders were not fully compensated for their surrendered
rights. Yet junior interests were participating in the reorganization.20 The Court
acknowledged that when "feasibility" requires a conservative capital structure
with a minimum of fixed-interest charges, all or part of seniors' claims may
be satisfied with inferior grades of securities or even the same securities
given juniors. But structural streamlining could not compel relinquishment
without compensation of any prior claim to earnings or assets; senior claim-
ants must receive other rights or greater participation-their precise nature
to vary with the facts of each case.2-7 But in each case new rights received
were to equal in value the old claims surrendered.
28
The plan was deemed unfair for another reason. While their principal
and interest rates matched, Consumers and Union bonds were secured by
different assets.29 The proposed plan gave the same new securities to both
bond classes and divided net income equally to service them, although no
valuation had been made of the underlying assets securing each class.80 The
warrants were exercised. But if certain interest delinquencies occurred, then the old
bondholders (holding the new preferred) would be entitled to elect six directors. Id. at
516-7.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 527-8.
27. Id. at 528-9.
28. Id. at 529-30.
29. Union bonds' aggregate face claim exceeded Consumers by over $1,000,000. See
note 23 supra. But Union bondholders claimed that Union's assets were "much greater
in volume and in value than those of Consumers." Id. at 525.
30. "The District Court did not find specific values for the separate properties of
Consolidated, Union, or Consumers." Id. at 517 (emphasis added). However, on the
basis of testimony of three witnesses, the average valuation (apparently based on physical
factors) of Union's property was $2,202,733 (Union face claim $2,280,555) and Con-
sumers' $1,151,033 (Consumers face claim $1,358,715). Ibid. Thus the District Court
found "that the present fair value of the assets admittedly subject to the trust indenture
of Union and Consumers was insufficient to pay the amount . . . of the respective bond
issues." Id. at 518. But the Supreme Court found this valuation procedure inadequate.
Id. at 524-5. But see Ecker v. Western Pacific Railroad Corp., 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
"There is nothing ... in the Dubois case to indicate that dollar valuations of the prop-
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Court considered valuation of underlying assets essential for measuring the
respective claims of Consumers and Union bondholders to test the plan's
fairness. And earnings potential was to be the basis for valuing the under-
lying assets. If no individual earnings records were available, some formula
must measure respective asset values. 31
While Consolidated Rock Products indicates the type of analysis and com-
pensation required to measure and fully satisfy bondholders' claims, the
Supreme Court has not yet defined the appropriate measure of preferred
stockholders' rights. However, the recent reorganization of Central States
Electric Corporation, an investment company, typifies the reliance by lower
Chapter X courts on preferreds' liquidation claims. 32 Central States' original
capital structure consisted of debentures, two classes of preferred shares and
common stock. Although the company was insolvent in 1942 when it peti-
tioned for reorganization, by 1950 market value of portfolio securities exceeded
debenture claims. 33 And the Fourth Circuit agreed with the SEC and district
court that market value was the appropriate method for valuing portfolio
assets of investment companies2 4 The plan replaced Central States and two
holding company subsidiaries with one investment company. One class of
common comprised the new capital structure2 5 The plan allocated to (1)
debenture holders new common with a market value roughly 5% above
debentures' liquidation claim; (2) senior preferred shareholders new common
erty or claims are essential for recapitalization or the distributions of securities in re-
organizations. The defect in Dubois was not the failure to find dollar values but the
failure to find the worth of the security behind independent mortgages on distinct proper-
ties .... "Id. at 482.
31. 312 U.S. at 524-5.
32. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951). The case is critically discussed in Billyou, Priority Rights
of Preferred and Connnon Shares in Bankruptcy Reorganication, 65 HArnv. L. R'v. 93
(1951). Cf. Petition of Portland Electric Power Co., 162 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nora. Watson v. Portland Electric Power Co., 332 U.S. 837 (1947) (Chapter
X); In re Childs Co., 69 F. Supp. 856 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) (Chapter X); In re Deep
Rock Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Standard Gas & Electric
Co. v. Taylor, 311 U.S. 699 (1940) (§ 77B). Central States is a "holding company with
a rather inactive portfolio of securities." 183 F.2d at 881.
33. Assets shrank to $1,400,000 in 1942. They rose, by 1950, to $38,000,000 at which
time debentures' total face claim was $20,700,000. Ibid.
34. Id. at 884. This valuation method is contrary to the usual practice of capitalizing
future earnings. See note 3 supra and text.
35. Id. at 882. The new investment company was to be "open-ended," i.e. new com-
mon would be redeemable at the option of its holders. But since the plan barred redemp-
tion for an initial sixty-day period, debentures and senior preferred received a 5% and
2V2% bonus respectively to compensate for the risk of market fluctuations in that period.
-d. at 832, 888. And since both old classes were losing their priorities in the reorganized
company by accepting common, the bonuses were thought necessary to compensate these
securities quantitatively for loss of their qualitative priority. Id. at 888-9.
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with a market value approximately 2%% above preferreds' liquidation claim
of par plus dividend arrearages; (3) junior preferred shareholders the
residual interest.3 6 Common received nothing.3 7 The bonuses to debentures
and senior preferreds were designed in part to compensate for loss of their
priorities in the new all-common stock structure."" The Fourth Circuit
approved the plan; the Supreme Court denied certiorari30
Claims measurement in Central States by preferreds' liquidation rights
parallels Los Angeles Lumber's reliance on the face amount of the debt to
measure bond claims. In both cases the courts treated these claims as fully
matured, although the due date of the bonds' principal in Los Angeles
Lumber was six years distant and "liquidation" was not, in fact, occurring in
Central States. The Central States approach is apparently based on the view
that bankruptcy reorganization is a substitute for liquidation, and therefore,
liquidation claims are the principal criterion for measuring preferred share-
holders' participation.40 In similar Chapter X cases, as well as Central
States, denials of certiorari have barred a square Supreme Court ruling on
the point.4' Moreover, Central States' "bonuses" to debenture and senior-
preferred holders for surrender of income priorities harmonizes with Consoli-
dated Rock Products' insistence on compensation for bondholders beyond the
same face amount of inferior securities. This identical Chapter X treatment
36. Security holders' claims were, roughly, as follows:
Debentures (including accrued and unpaid interest) ................... $20,700,000
Senior Preferred (7%) (liquidation preference) ....................... 15,800,000
Junior Preferred (6%) (liquidation preference) ....................... 31,300,000
Common (par $1) ................................................... 10,100,100
Id. at 881. Since total assets were valued at $38,000,000 and stock liquidation claims were
held governing, junior preferred would receive the remainder and common nothing.
37. See note 36 supra.
38. See note 35 supra.
39. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1950), cerf.
denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951).
40. "[Fjrom the standpoint of these stockholders, the old corporation is being virtu-
ally dissolved and wound up and . . . a new corporation is being created as a result of
the reorganization. Consequently these preferred shareholders are entitled to the liquida-
tion preference for which their stock provides." 183 F.2d at 885. See also In re Childs
Co., SEC Corporate Reorg. Release No. 67, p. 44 (Sept. 30, 1946); Dodd, Preferred
Shareholders Rights-The Engineers Public Service Company Case, 63 HARv. L. Rtv.
298 (1949). "Reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act are substitutes for liquidation,
and there seems no reason to doubt that in such reorganizations liquidation preferences
must be treated as matured, as bondholders' claims to principal must be under . . . [Los
Angeles Lumber] . . . "Id. at 305. For criticism of this view see Billyou, note 32 siipra.
41. See note 32 supra.
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stems, of course, from the initial equation of stock liquidation rights with
bond face claims.
Consolidated Rock Products also prescribes a particular type of bond
analysis that apparently goes well beyond reliance on face amount of debt
to measure bondholder claims. In that case, the Supreme Court emphasized
the necessity of valuing the assets which secured bonds with identical face
claims. However, the Court did not articulate the full relevance of the
divsional-value analysis. If the value of securing assets was below the face
amount of bondholders' claims, the Court's insistence on the analysis may
have extended only to determine the part of each class' liquidation claim that
could be satisfied from its underlying assets. This would not involve a sub-
stantial departure from principal reliance on the face amount of the debt. On
the other hand, if the value of the securing assets exceeded bondholders'
liquidation claims, 42 the analysis takes on new significance: an allocation
yardstick beyond face claims; to determine, for example, the comparative
worth of each class' expectation of future interest payments. If that interpre-
tation is correct, the Court must have meant that face amounts taken alone are
incapable of measuring the relative value of competing claims, and that
reorganizers, therefore, must exanine the value of other rights in the invest-
ment contract as well. In fact, later § 77 cases, relying on Consolidated Rock
Products, made divisional earning inquiries a prerequisite to allocation fair-
ness.4 3
INVESTMENT VALUE IN § 77 REORGANIZATIONS
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, governing railroad reorganizations, also
prescribes "fair and equitable" as the allocation standard.44 Depression years
brought many of the country's debt-laden roads under § 77.Y ICC emphasis
on "feasible" reorganization plans has required drastic structural changes,40
further complicating allocation problems. And the ICC, with judicial approval,
has considered contract rights other than face and liquidation in measuring
investors' claims to new securities.
42. For valuation data available see note 30 supra.
43. See text on § 77 cases infra.
44. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §205 (1946). Analysis of proce-
dures and standards in the 1933 statute is found in Dodd, Reorganization through Banh-
ruptcy: A Renedy for What?, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1100 (1935). For historical discussion
of standards of allocation fairness applied in railroad and other reorganizations, see
Swaine, Reorganication of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Lost Decade, 27
COl L. Rv. 901 (1927), 28 CoL. L. Rzv. 29 (1928); and Rodgers & Groom, Reorganica-
tion of Railroad Corporations Under Section 77 of the Banhruptey Act, 33 COL. L RLn.
571 (1933). For more recent appraisals see, Polatsek, The Wreck of the Old 77, 34
CoRx a TL. Q. 532'(1949) ; Swaine, note 1 supra.
45. Swaine, supra note 1, at 1037.
46. E.g. cases discussed in text infra.
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The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific 47 plan substituted system-
secured bonds for the numerous old bond issues secured by divisional liens.
48
Proposed new securities were: (1) 4% Firsts secured by a first system
mortgage;49 (2) income bonds in two series (A and B) secured by a second
system mortgage; 50 (3) non-cumulative preferred stock; 5 ' (4) no-par com-
mon. 5 2 The allowable capitalization based on expected earnings fell below the
aggregate face claims of bondholders.5 3 Since the plan contemplated pre-
serving old face claims, part of the most-junior bondholders' claim was wiped
out. No equity was left for shareholders.
Allocation of new securities to compensate senior divisionally-secured bonds
posed a knotty problem. Each class sought large portions of the more desir-
able securities, basing its demand on special indenture provisions and the
particular earnings potential of its securing assets.5 4 The ICC examined the
earnings record of divisional assets securing the various issues. For example,
the fixed charges of Milwaukee & Northern Firsts had been earned three
times; the earnings coverage of the eastern division bonds and Mil-
waukee & Northern Consolidateds was only 1.16 and 1.2 respectively.
In view of the greater likelihood of earnings to meet the former class' interest
charges, fairness required allocation of system securities sufficient to compen-
47. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Rail-
road Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
48. Id. at 529.
49. The new First Mortgage would have a first lien on all properties of the debtor,
subject only to the lien of equipment obligations. Issuance of $58,923,171 principal amount
of First Mortgage bonds was contemplated. Id. at 531-2.
50. This General Mortgage would have a lien on all property of the debtor subject
only to the lien of the First Mortgage and and equipment obligations. Interest on both
Series A and B income bonds, secured by the General Mortgage, would be 41/%, con-
tingent on earnings and cumulative up to 132%. Series A had priority to interest over
Series B. Series B bonds were convertible into common at any time at the rate of tel
shares per $1000 bond. Both series A and B were entitled to a sinking fund out of available
net income with annual payments equal to h of 1% or the aggregate principal. Issuance
of $57,256,669 in series A and $51,422,111 in Series B bonds was contemplated. Id. at 532,
51. New preferred, called Series A, had a 5% dividend rate and voting rights.
Although non-cumulative, no dividends were payable on common unless there had
been paid or set aside for payment on Series A, dividends at the rate of 5% annually
for the three consecutive income periods immediately preceding. And Series A preferred
was to participate with common to the extent of $1 per share after common received $3.50 per
share. Id. at 532, 532 n. 5.
52. Each share had one vote. Over 500,000 shares were reserved for conversion of
Series B General Mortgage Bonds. Ibid.
53. Allowable capitalization was $548,533,321. Id. at 534. Total debt was $627,000,000.
Id. at 529.
54. E.g. see summary of arguments made by Terre Haute bondholders. Id. at 546
et seq.
55. Id. at 559.
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sate Milvaukee & Northern Firsts for surrendering a more valuable interest
claim. As a result, 70% of the former class' claim was paid in 4% Firsts and the
remainder in Class A Incomes. The securities bundle given the latter classes
contained a smaller percentage of the choicer bonds; 40% of their claim was
paid in Class B Incomes and preferred stock. 0 And the same lien-earnings
approach measured the claims of the remaining divisional bonds.
The eastern divisional bonds appealed to the Supreme Court. Vhile they
had obtained "only a face amount of inferior securities equal to the face
amount of their claims," the eastern divisionals charged that more-junior 50-
year bonds had received a large amount of common stock. 7 The eastern
divisionals also claimed credit for earnings of some eastern lines allegedly
securing their mortgage." The ICC had not determined whether this property
was subject to an "after-acquired" clause in the complaining bondholders'
indenture; instead, the ICC simply had credited the earnings to the Adjust-
ment bonds.59 The Court agreed with both contentions: "Where junior
interests participate in a plan and where senior creditors are allotted only a
face amount of inferior securities equal to the face amount of their claims, they
'must receive, in addition, compensation for the [surrendered] senior
rights.' "69 While the Supreme Court held the ICC's divisional analysis
essential to allocation fairness, the absence of a finding on the coverage of
the "after-acquired" clause was also reversible error:61 whether senior
creditors have been fully compensated "involves a consideration of the
numerous investment features of the old and new securities and a financial
analysis of many factors."'62 Remanding, the Court directed the ICC and the
district court to determine the coverage of the "after-acquired" clause and
what the eastern divisionals should receive in addition to an equal face amount
of inferior securities "as equitable compensation, qualitative or quantitative,
for the loss of their senior rights."' '
The Denver & Rio Grande WestcruG4 plan also demanded divisional
analysis. New first mortgage bonds, income bonds, preferred and common
stock replaced the numerous old bond classes. Claimants received varying
56. Id. at 534-5.
57. Id. at 569.
58. Id. at 568.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Id. at 568-9.
62. Id. at 571.
63. Ibid.
64. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company Reorganization, 254 I.C.C.
349 (1943), aff'd, In re Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 62 F.Supp.
384 (D. Colorado 1944), rev'd, 150 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1945), rev'd sitb rom. RFC v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 328 U.S. 495 (1946); noted in 60
HARv. L. REV. 291 (1946); 14 U. CH. L. Rsv. 84 (1946).
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proportions of these four new securities.6 5 The ICC estimated the relative
contribution of each issue's underlying properties to system earnings. And
the new bundles reflected each lien's contribution to the system's value: more
valuable liens received larger proportions of the choicer securities.00 Although
only the ICC's decision on allowable capitalization-not securities allocation-
was challenged by junior interests, the Supreme Court, in dicta, approved the
Commission's lien-earnings analysis.
67
The "qualitative or quantitative" compensation the Supreme Court had
required in Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific 68 is illustrated by the
Missouri Pacific " reorganization. Missouri Pacific and two of its subsid-
iaries, International and New Orleans, entered reorganization. While in-
solvency struck the parent and International, New Orleans remained com-
paratively prosperous.1 0 Mindful of the public interest and "feasibility," the
ICC insisted on merging the subsidiaries with the parent and issuing system
65.
Distribution of New Securities Per
$1,000 Present Bonds With Accrued Interest
First Mortgage Income P/S C/S
Bonds Bonds
Rio Grande Western first trusts $ 970.20 $349.80 -
Rio Grande Western consolidateds 266.00 970.90 93.10
Junction firsts 1,061.96 317.21 -
Denver & Rio Grande consol. 4's 318.92 217.08 321.60 482.40
Denver & Rio Grande consol. 4 's 329.03 223.97 331.80 497.70
Refunding and improvement S's 250.01 159.61 310.75 692.13
Refunding and improvement 6's 264.61 168.94 328.90 732,55
General 5's 146.10
328 U.S. at 502 n. 6. All new securities had a par value. The plan eliminated shareholders,
unsecured creditors and 90% of the most-junior bondholders' (General 5's) claims, Id.
at 502.
66. "The value of a lien on a part of a railroad when the valuation is made from
earnings cannot be fixed solely on a mileage basis. Nor is it practicable to issue new
securities with a lien limited to the property that was covered by the old lien. There must
be segregation of the system earnings to each existing lien and allocation of securities
representing the system value to each class of claimants. This was done here as shown in
the... table... [note 65 supra]. Such a method is in full accord with the principle that
senior creditors are to retain their relative priority of position in a reorganization.' Id.
at 517.
67. Id. at 534. See dicta quoted in note 66 supra.
68. See text at note 63 supra.
69. Missouri Pacific Railroad Reorganization, 275 I.C.C. 59, 203 (1949), approved,
In re Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 93 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd s lb
orom. State of Texas v. Group of Institutional Investors, 191 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1951).
These reports represent the most recent stage of reorganization proceedings that com-
menced in 1933.
70. The Cbmmission valued New Orleans at $83,700,000. 191 F2d at 273. Bond-
holders' 0laims, including Equipment Obligations, but excluding unsecured creditors, were
less than $44,000,000 as of January 1, 1948. 93 F.Supp. at 855 (Appendix D).
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securities.71 As a consequence, treatment of prosperous New Orleans securi-
ties posed a major allocation problem.
The ICC examined the earnings potential of assets underlying the securities
to measure the comparative worth of each class' income claim. The plan gave
New Orleans' only bond issue its principal in Series A Firsts--choicest
of the new system securities-and its unpaid interest in cash. No other
security fared so well.72 New Orleans common (par $100) had been valued
at $150 per share on the basis of that subsidiary's past and prospective earn-
ings,73 so that public holders of the stock were allotted $150 per share in new
system income bonds.74 And to compensate for dilution of the right to share
in New Orleans' earnings, each old share was entitled to %4 share of new
Class A common ($100 stated-value). 7r Thus, total face value of the new
securities given for each $100 par value was $175. The ICC accorded
comparable treatment to Iissouri Pacific serial bonds secured by parent-held
New Orleans common; and the Eighth Circuit approved the plan"
Since roads in reorganization in the past have rarely had assets exceeding
the face amount of debt, generalization regarding treatment of preferred shares
under § 77 is difficult. However, courts make no doctrinal distinction between
Chapter X and § 77 reorganizations. Thus, despite the fact that liquidation
is indeed a remote alternative to reorganization, Central States' main reliance
on preferred liquidation preferences nay indicate the lead § 77 courts will
follow. In cases where preferred has participated in § 77 reorganizations, their
liquidation claims so far exceeded the value of remaining securities that other
yardsticks probably would not have permitted juniors' participation either.""
71. 275 I.C.C. at 105-6; 191 F.2d at 269-71.
72. Holders of equipment obligations and general claims, however, were given prefer-
ence over all other claimants, including New Orleans bondholders. 275 I.C.C. at 131.
73. Id. at 125.
74. Ibid.
75. Id. at 125-6. In effect, allocation of the relatively high-quality system bonds and the
"e.xtra" system common was a tribute to the high investment value of New Orleans common.
76. Since the stock (almost 82% of the total outstanding) pledged as collateral for
the serial bonds represented the controlling interest in New Orleans, the ICC felt these
shares "may ... have a greater value than the small amount of shares outstanding vwith
the public although such additional value is speculative and not susceptible of appraisal.
This control value entitles the holders of these [serial] bonds to a more favorable overall
treatment in the reorganization in satisfaction of their total claim than if the amount
of New Orleans stock held as collateral did not represent such control." Id. at 126.
77. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Company Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 199
(1938). Dollar value of remaining authorized capitalization was $10,401,783; preferreds'
liquidation claim (par plus arrearages) was 39,242,058. "[T]he right of the preferred
stockholders to receive cumulative dividends and the amount of these unpaid dividends...
must be considered in preference to the right of the holders of common stock to partici-
pate in the securities of the reorganized company." Id. at 231-2. In re Chicago, Great
Western Railway Company, 29 F.Supp. 149 (N.D. I1. 1939) Par value of remaining
authorized securities equaled $11,518,400; preierreds' liquidation claim (ihilud-
ing arrearages) was $87,539,650. Id. at 160. See quotation in text at note 78 infra.
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In the Chicago, Great Western Railway case, for example, the district court
rejected common's argument for participation, reasoning that "those [pre-
ferred] stockholders receive shares having a total par value of $11,518,400.
. . . This stock is given them for a total claim of $87,539,650 including
accumulated dividends. It is self-evident that this treatment does not fully
compensate them." s78  Similarly in Missouri Pacific ne-w securities allotted
to preferred shareholders fell so far short of their liquidation claim that little
analysis was needed to substantiate the ICC's opinion that common had no
value.79
Problems created by mergers and substitution of system securities for divi-
sional-bonds demonstrate how in § 77 cases analysis of the full investment
value measures debt claims which must be "fully" compensated. And the
same analysis was applied to New Orleans common stock in Missouri
Pacific. Face claims have only limited utility when the earning potentials of
securing assets vary. The problem is the same-in more complex form-that
Consolidated Rock Products presented. But § 77 cases make explicit what was
perhaps implicit in that case under Chapter X. Even when total corporate
worth exceeds the face claims of bond classes, investment value analysis of
other aspects of their contract rights is essential to ensure fair allocations.
Under § 77, the courts look to the present value of a bond's claim to earnings,
as well as to its other features. The greater the likelihood of divisional earn-
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company Reorganization, 275 I.C.C. 59 (1949), plan approved,
In re Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 93 F.Supp. 832 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd sub noni.
State of Texas v. Group of Institutional Investors, 191 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1951). Remain-
ing authorized capitalization was about $30,000,000; preferreds' claim, including accumu-
lated dividends, exceeded $163,000,000. 275 I.C.C. at 130.
78. In re Chicago, Great Western Railway Company, 29 F.Supp. 149, 160 (N.D.
Ill. 1939) (emphasis added).
79. 275 I.C.C. at 130. See note 77 supra. But cf. the district court's reasoning in
upholding the plan. "After satisfaction of creditors, only about $30,000,000 par value Class
B common stock of the new System securities remained. It is argued that it is improper
to require satisfaction of the accumulated dividends on the preferred stock, before per-
mitting common stockholders to share in the remaining equity. As the Commission said,
under the circumstances there could be no other method of satisfaction of the preferred
stock claim. The relative priorities could not otherwise be maintained except by a
requirement that the first $92,000,000 in dividends declared on this $30,000,000 Class B
stock be paid to the old preferred holders. Assuming an annual $5 dividend, payment
of $92,000,000 would take about sixty years. It is impossible to find that the common
stock has any equity." 93 F. Supp. at 850-1. This analysis parallels investment value
analysis of preferred and common stock claims under the Holding Company Act and §§ 5
and 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act, discussed in the text infra. However, in affirm-
ing this treatment of preferred, the Eighth Circuit merely cited its approval without a
discussion. 191 F.2d at 265.
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ings to pay fixed-interest charges, the more valuable is that interest claim.
The "quality" or "quantity" of new securities may furnish the "equitable equiva-
lent" of old rights. 'More valuable claims may receive new securities with the
same face value given other claimants, but the securities must be of higher
quality. Or, superior old claims may receive larger face amounts of the same
grade given juniors. In short, "full compensation" requires that reorganiza-
tion plans recognize differing values.
INVESTMIENT VALUE IN HOLDING COMPANY SIMPLIFIcATIONS
As in Chapter X and § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress made "fair
and equitable" the substantive criterion for simplifications under § 11 of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.80 Section 11 requires reg-
istered holding companies to simplify their corporate structures where
holding company units unnecessarily complicate the system, where voting
power is inequitably distributed and where there are more than two levels
of holding companies above the operating base.-" To reach these goals, the
SEC was empowered to amnend and approve plans voluntarily submitted by
holding companies,82 or initiate proceedings where utilities offered no plans.m
The Commission interpreted "fair and equitable" against a significant
factual backdrop. Holding companies' publicly-held preferred stock, at the
end of 1938, had involuntary liquidation claims topping $3,500,000,000.84
Thus, allocation of new securities based on full recognition of old liquidation
preferences often would have wiped out common stock interests. But manage-
ment control stemmed from concentrated holdings of common, and whole-
sale obliteration of their interests would hardly have evoked cooperation from
an industry already hostile to the Act's mandates.8 Furthermore, common
holders, to avoid erasure of their interests, would undoubtedly have pressed
the Commission to simplify by methods other than dissolution or liquidation.8
80. 49 STAT. 803, 821 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79K (1946). For comprehensive discussion
of the Act's background, objectives, and operation, consult Comment, Section 11(b) of
The Holding Company Act: Fifteen Years In Retrospect, 59 Y,%LE L.J. 10,3 (1950).
See also Blair-Smith & Helfenstein, A Death Sentence or a New Lease on L'fe? A Sur-
vey of Corporate Adjustments Under the Public Utility Holding Coinpany Act, 94 U. oF
PA. L Rnv. 148 (1946); Dodd, The Relative Rights of Preferred and Common Share-
holders in Recapitalization Plans undcr the Holding Company Act, 57 HAIM'. L REv. 295
(1944); Note, 93 U. OF PA. L. REv. 303 (1945).
81. § 11(b) (2).
82. § 11(e). Almost all holding company systems subject to the Act have taken
advantage of this opportunity. Comment, supra note SO, at 1107.
83. §11(b)(2).
84. 56% of holding company preferred and 27%'o of preferred issued by operating
companies had dividend arrearages. Dodd, supra note 80, at 303.
85. See Comment, supra note SO, at 1111.
86. For illustrations of different simplification techniques, see Blair-Smith & Helfen-
stein, supra note 80, at 157-8. Cf. "[1]t should be immaterial whether the simplification
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United Light & Power Co. illustrates the SEC's investment value approach
to measuring the relative claims of preferred and common shareholders.8 7
The simplification plan called for Power's dissolution and distribution of its
portfolio securities. Power's preferred had a charter liquidation claim of par
($100) plus dividend arrearages, before common could share in the assets, in
the event of "dissolution or liquidation." Preferred's claim, including $38,-
700,000 in dividend arrearages, exceeded $98,700,000.88 Since the portfolio
securities were valued at roughly $81,000,000,80 common would receive noth-
ing if preferred's liquidation rights alone measured its claim. But the SEC
held a § 11 simplification not a liquidation within the meaning of the charter;
the charter-liquidation preference, therefore, did not control.90 Instead, the
Commission attempted to value preferred and common's claim to future
earnings. On the assumption that Power would continue in business, the
SEC estimated future average annual earnings of $6,185,000.1 Since the
annual preferred dividend requirements were $3,600,000, a balance of $2,585,-
000 would be available annually to pay off preferred's arrearages. Further
postulating that all available income would, in fact, be used to pay current
dividend requirements and reduce arrearages, the Commission found that com-
mon would share in Power's earnings after 15 years. 92 The SEC then allotted
common 5.48% of Power's portfolio securities. 93
process takes the form of a recapitalization, merger, or distribution of the assets of a
holding company in liquidation. In other words, the 'fair and equitable' standard requires
the same recognition of substantive rights irrespective of the method employed in a par-
ticular case for attaining the objective of Section 11(b) (2)." United Light & Power
Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4215, p. 10 (April 6, 1943). See note 97 inlra.
87. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4215 (April 6, 1943).
88. Id. at 6.
89. This figure was the book value of Power's assets. On the basis of a capitalization
of reasonably anticipated earnings, the SEC was "unable to find an over-all value for the
assets which approaches $98,700,000." Id. at 7-8.
90. Id. at 34. "Decisions like ... Los Angeles Lumber and Boyd .. . are predi-
cated on sets of facts fundamentally distinguishable from the situation arising here. In
bankruptcy or equity reorganizations, where some financial disaster overtakes or threatens
to overtake an enterprise, the courts and Congress have proceeded on the theory that it Is
often in the interest of creditors and other claimants that the enterprise be permitted to
continue in operation, but with a new capital structure. Creditors and other claimants
are prevented from foreclosing or otherwise compelling an actual liquidation, but new
securities are distributed among them according to their contractual rights determined as
though in liquidation." Id. at 9.
The Commission's holding is contrary to its dicta in an earlier § 11 case. Federal Water
Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893 (1941). There the SEC said that if the appropriate § 11
plan called for liquidation, "fair and equitable" would yield the same result as if the
company were a debtor in a. bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. Id. at 910.
91. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4215, p. 18 (April 6, 1943).
92. Ibid.
93.- The Company's plan initially gave common 8.8% of the portfolio securities. The
Commission lowered this to "approximately 5%." Id. at 19.
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Preferred carried the appeal to the Supreme Court: Otis & Co. v. SEC
upheld the Commission.94 The majority held charter liquidation rights not
exclusively binding: "absolute priority" embodied in the statutory "fair and
equitable" standard did not require liquidation rights to be the sole basis for
claims measurement.9 5 The Court reasoned that the applicability of the
charter provision under the Holding Company Act was a matter of federal
law."6 And Congress did not intend the operation of the Act to destroy legiti-
mate investment values: "Enforcement of an overriding public policy should
not have its effect visited on one class with a corresponding windfall to another
class of security holders. '0 7 Further, Congress did not intend the Act to
mature otherwise dormant rights.0 8 The minority, on the other hand, started
with the charter-fixed liquidation priority: since the plan required liquidation,
liquidation rights should have controlled allocations to preferred. 3  More-
over, the minority found it difficult to believe that a stockholder who contracted
for liquidation priority was at all concerned with particular reasons for
liquidation. 00
While Otis ruled out liquidation rights as to the sole allocation guide,
Central-Iilnwis i0 defined the factors relevant to investment value analysis.
Central-Illinois involved liquidation of the Engineers Public Service Com-
pany and distribution of proceeds to its common and three classes of preferred
stock. All three classes had involuntary liquidation preferences of $100 and call
prices of $105, $110, and $110 respectively. After considering issuance price as
well as dividend and market history, the Commission analyzed assets and earn-
ings coverage of each preferred class and found their investment value at least
equal to the respective call prices.10 2 In reaching this conclusion, the SEC relied
most heavily on expert testimony concerning estimated earnings, which
when capitalized exceeded call price.'0 3 However the district court, in light
94. 323 U.S. 624 (1945); noted, c.g., 5S HARv. L REv. 604 (1945).
95. 323 U.S. at 633-6.
96. Id. at 636.
97. "[C]ommon stock values ... [should not] depend on whether the Commission,
in enforcing compliance with the Act, resorts to dissolution of a particular company in
the holding company system, or resorts instead to the devices of merger or consolidation
which would not run afoul of a charter provision... . The Commission in its enforce-
ment of the policies of the Act should not be hampered in its determination of the
proper type of holding company structure by considerations of avoidance of harsh effects
on various stock interests... ." Id. at 637-8.
98. Id. at 638.
99. Id. at 643-4.
100. Id. at 644.
101. SEC v. Central-IIinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949). For full discus-
sion see Dodd, Preferred Slureholdcrs' Rights-The Engincers Public Service Company
Case, 63 HAv. L RLr. 298 (1949).
102. 338 U.S. at 103, 106, 144-6.
103. Id. at 104-5, 144.
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of "colloquial equities," amended the plan to reduce preferreds' claim to $100
per share. 0 4 The lower court felt "practically certain" that the company received
no more than $98 per share for any of the three classes and that the public
had paid no more than $100 per share. Thus the court held it unfair to allow
preferred shareholders their call premium. °5 The Supreme Court reversed.100
It upheld the Commission, brushing "colloquial equities" aside. For the Court,
the only relevant factors were those affecting investment value; issuance price
and market history were not determinative of investor claims. Since the Coln-
mission had not departed from "legal standards," and supported its finding
with "substantial evidence," the district court erred.'0 7
More recently, in the Leventritt case,108 the Supreme Court upheld the
elimination of perpetual stock warrants despite a showing of present market
value. Estimating the corporation's prospective earnings, the Commission
discovered no reasonable expectation that the market price of the stock
would exceed the option price in the foreseeable future. The Court deemed
"the informed judgment of the Commission, rather than that of the market"
the appropriate guide to "fair and equitable" under the Holding Company
Act.
0 9
Investment value analysis, however, does not guarantee common participa-
tion. If estimated earnings, absent simplification, cannot meet preferred divi-
(lend requirements, common is excluded. 110 Similarly, common will be ex-
cluded if too many years would elapse before it could share in earnings,
Although no automatic cut-off date exists, common has not participated in
any plan where it had no earnings prospects for the next thirty-five years.11
104. 71 F. Supp. 797, 801 (D. Del. 1947).
105. Ibid.
106. SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949). The Third Circuit
had reversed the district court on the issue of the lower court's power to amend § 11
plans. 168 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1948). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the
district court with directions to reinstate the Commission's judgment. 338 U.S. at 155.
107. Id. at 151-2, 155.
108. Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951); noted, 60
YALE L.J. 371 (1951); 37 VA. L. REv. 452 (1951).
109. 340 U.S. at 346-7.
110. E.g. Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No, 4501
(August 24, 1943). "The annual dividend requirement of $3 per share on the Class A
stock aggregates $330,000. There is no apparent possibility that the income of the com-
pany would ever reach this amount after paying interest and current preferred dividend
requirements. Under these circumstances we think that no participation for the Class B
stock is justified. . . ." Id. at 18. Accord: Federal Water Service Corp., 8 SE.C. 893,
914 (1941) (Class B common with no reasonable possibility of ever receiving dividends
is eliminated).
111. (1) Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893 (1941). Majority estimated 11
years to pay off preferred's arrearages. Id. at 905. Class A common was allotted 5% of
the new common stock. Id. at 913. (2) Virginia Public Service Co., SEC Holding Co.
Act Release No. 4618 (October 16, 1943). Estimated 10-15 years to pay arrearages,
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While in theory the investment measure remains the same whether old in-
vestors are paid in cash or new securities, the SEC's emphasis in fact shifts
with the medium of payment. If old shareholders receive new securities, the
Commission seeks to equate earnings expectations, risk factors, and liquidation
privileges of the old and new securities; no dollar value is fixed for either.
112
But if cash is distributed, dollar valuation of old securities becomes necessary.
Here the SEC tests compensation against the cost of comparable securities
enabling the investor to approximate his former investment position. As a
consequence, heavy weight is given market value of these investment alterna-
tives.1 3
In contrast to stocks, § 11 measurement of bondholders' claims has pie-
sented few problems. Bondholders' claims to principal are usually paid
in cash.114  And when the investment value-based on favorable maturity
date, interest rate, and risk factors--exceeds the principal, a bond may receive
up to its redemption price.1 5 In Comnmnity Gas & Power,"06 however, the
SEC allocated no-par common with average annual expected dividends of
$75.58 to debentures yielding $60 annually." 7 The Third Circuit did not
question the Commission's view that the primary measure of debenture
id. at 29; common given 9% of new common, id. at 31. (3) American Utilities Service
Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5114 (June 22, 1944). Nine years to pay
arrearages, id. at 10; common received about 15%, id. at 12. (4) Puget Sound Power
and Light Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4255 (April 28, 1943). 18.4 to 34.1
years necessary to pay arrearages, depending on earnings estimate used, id. at 23;
common received approximately 3% of the new common, id. at 26. But cf.
Commissioner Healy's dissenting view on common's dividend prospects. Id. at 53. And
see Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4501 (April 24,
1943). "While the existence of an accumulation of the preferred dividends of over
$1,300,000 would make it impossible for the Class A stock to receive any dividends for a
number of years, we [the SEC] think that there is sufficient pussibility that the Class A
stock might some time receive some income from the company to warrant participation
by the Class A stock . . ." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Commissioner Healy in dissent,
however, computed the future date of the stock's dividend prospects: 95 years distant.
"When common stock cannot be expected to participate for so many years I do not believe
it has a value." Id. at 36. For Commissioner Healy's persistent dissents from the major-
ity's investment value approach see Note, 93 U. OF P.A. L. REv. 303, 317 n. 48 (1945).
112. SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 143-4 (1949).
113. Id. at 144. But see Community Gas and Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act
Release No. 7131 (January 15, 1947). "Though market prices of comparable securities
may be considered in arriving at price-earnings ratios, even those figures are for compar-
ison purposes only, and are not determinative." Id. at 20.
114. 338 U.S. at 157 n. 4. Since these companies are solvent, there is no prublem t'i
unpaid interest.
115. E.g. American Power and Light Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6176
(November 1, 1945).
116. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7131 (January 15, 1947), approed, In re
Community Gas and Power Co., 71 F.Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1947), aff'd, 18 F2d 740 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1947) ; noted, 49 CoL L. Rrv. 134 (1949).
117. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7131, p. 16 (January 15, 1947).
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holders' rights was their claim to prospective earnings, not the bonds' face
value or the market value of securities allocated. 118 And the larger anticipated
return fully compensated them for receipt of an inferior grade of securities.
Consideration of liquidation preferences as but one of the rights old in-
vestors relinquish has favored common stock interests. Clearly, investment
value analysis has enabled common to participate when sole reliance on pre-
ferred liquidation claims would have excluded them.119 The SEC further
enhances common's position by frequently relying on cheerful estimates of
future earnings to determine if and how much common will share.' 20 In the
United Light & Power dissolution, for example, future average annual earn-
ings were estimated above $6,000,000. But not only did this amount approx-
imate the most optimistic estimate made; actual earnings had topped it only
once in the prior decade.' 21 True, less optimistic estimates might grant pre-
ferred holders earnings above stock guarantees. 22 However, when both
preferred and common receive different quantities of the same securities,
common gets a windfall in the event of income falling below estimated levels.
Also running through SEC computations is the admittedly unrealistic assump-
tion that all available future earnings will be applied to pay current preferred
118. Id. at 20. In re Community Gas and Power Co., 168 F.2d 740 (3d Cir.), ceri.
denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1947).
119. See cases cited in note 111 supra.
120. E.g. American Utilities Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5114
(June 22, 1944). The Commission assumed net income applicable to preferred and com-
mon stocks to be $245,000. Id. at 10. In the period from 1938-1943 neither the average
nor any one year's income reached this figure. Id. at 9; Federal Water Service Corp.,
8 S.E.C. 893 (1941). Compare the 1935-1940 actual earnings with the 1941 estilmated
earnings. The latter figure was apparently the basis for the Commission's decision. Id.
at 905, 932.
"[T]he Commission's view is that common shareholders are entitled to participation
even though they would, if the capital structure remained unchanged, participate in earn-
ings only if the unfavorable possibilities did not eventuate and the actual future earnings
approached more nearly to the maximum rather than to the minimum or even the median
estimate which an informed foresight would have made." Dodd, supra note 80, at 317.
See also id. at 300.
121. Management offered the most optimistic earnings estimate: between $6,500,000
and $7,000,000. "However, it must be pointed out that in view of the actual earnings ex-
perience and the intangible factors discussed, this figure must be regarded as a very liberal
assumption as to earning power." United Light and Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act
Release No. 4215, pp.18-9 (April 6, 1943).
122. See Otis and Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1948). "Only by means of forced liqui-
dation and the receipt of all ... [the common], could Power's preferred gain a right to
prospective earnings above its guaranteed dividends." Id. at 632. "Enforcement of an
overriding public policy should not have its effect visited on one class with a corresponding
windfall to another class of security holders." Id. at 637.
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dividends and reduce arrearages.'tm This hastens the date of common's earn-
ing participation, and thus supports present allocations to it. Moreover, while
theoretically there is no minimum amount preferred must receive, call price
sets a ceiling on its participation124
INVESTMENT VALUE IN RAILROAD MERGERS UNDER § 5 OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act 15 authorizes the ICC to amend
and approve railroad merger or consolidation plans which are "just and
reasonable" and in the "public interest."' ' Power to initiate plans, however,
rests solely with carrier management. Fostering "an integrated, efficient and
coordinated system" of rail transportation via this Act 12 - thus depends largely
on railroad cooperation.
The Supreme Court first interpreted "just and reasonable" in the Schwa-
bacher case.2S The controversy arose out of the Chesapeake & Ohio and Pere
Marquette merger. 2 9 Pere Marquette's charter provided that in case of a vol-
untary or involuntary "dissolution, liquidation, or winding up of the company,"
preferred would receive par ($100) plus arrearages before common participa-
tion. Arrearages totaled $72.50 per share when merger proceedings began in
1945. The ICC refused to require allocations based on liquidation rights. Instead,
the Commission considered the stock's market value, past yield, as well as divi-
dend prospects.130 However, market value was apparently the most significant
123. Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893, 905 (1941); American Utilities
Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5114, p. 10 (June 22, 1944); United Light and
Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4215, p. 18 (April 6, 1943).
124. SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 145 (1949).
125. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 41 STAT. 4S.30 (1920), 54 STAT. 905 (1940), 49
U.S.C. §5 (1946).
126. § 5 (1) and (2) (b). A strict reading of the statute apparently limits "just and
reasonable" to ICC amendments to merger or consolidation proposals. "If the Commission
finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be
just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within the scope of... [the statute] and
will be consistent with the public interest, it shall enter an order approving . . . such
transaction. . . ." Cf. Section 20b's "just and reasonable" test, note 142 infra. However,
the Supreme Court regarded "just and reasonable" as applicable to the whole plan. See
discussion of Schwabacher in text.
127. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182- (1948). See D~xcI.stio oF NA-
TIOxAL TRA.,NSPo0TATI0oN PoLIcY, 54 STAT. 899 (1940), preceding 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
For a review of federal railroad legislation pertaining, to merger, see LEoNARD, RAILrOAD
COzSoLiDAEiON uL-DE THE T NsroraTnor Acr or 1920 (1946).
128. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948); noted, 97 U. oF PA. L
REV. 130 (1948).
129. Pere Marquette Railvay Company Merger, 267 I.C.C. 207 (1947).
130. Id. at 246.
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measure.131 While the market value per preferred share ranged from $87 to
$99, the merger terms substituted stocks which would have realized about $90
and $111 per share on the same dates.' 32 And of course Pere Marquette com-
mon participated in the merger.
The Supreme Court upheld the allocation 13 over preferred's contention that
liquidation rights controlled. To the Court, interpretation of the Act's "just
and reasonable" standard was a matter of "federal law"; charter liquidation
rights "as a matter of federal law" did not apply.'8 4 The Court further noted
that, rather than the charter's promise to the stockholder, the "current worth
of that promise" measured stockholders' claims.' 3 r And, in dicta, the Court
went beyond the immediate .problem of shareholder rights. The purpose of
the statute "to bring within its scope everything pertaining to the capital
structures of such mergers could hardly be made more plain."'3 0 Although
the Chesapeake & Ohio assumed without alterations all debts of Pere Mar-
quette, the dictum implies that bonds as well as stocks may be subject to ICC
investment value analysis. The Court relied heavily on Otis, a case under
"a federal statute of very similar purposes.' 37 "Fair and equitable" and "just
and reasonable" thus coalesced.
Like Otis under § 11, Schwabacher adapts allocation standards to § 5's
statutory goals. Roads whose low earnings have left preferred or income bond
arrearages may need the efficiencies flowing from unified operations. Yet
management, representing common stock interests, will not seek mergers or
consolidations if preferreds' liquidation rights control allocations. Attenuation
of liquidation rights thus implements § 5's philosophy of transportation
efficiency.
INVESTMENT VALUE UNDER § 20b OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE AcT
Dissatisfaction with erasure of junior interests in lengthy and expensive
§ 77 reorganizations inspired the Railroad Modification Law of 1948-section
131. "The controlling factor in the determination of the offer to the Pere Marquette
was recent market prices for the stocks of the carriers affected." Id. at 235. But the ICC
later added: "In the discharge of our duty . . . to find whether the (merger] terms . . ,
are just and reasonable, we cannot confine our inquiry to market opinion, but must give
consideration to all relevant elements of value." Id. at 238.
132. Id. at 237-8.
133. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948). However, the Court re-
versed the lower tribunals on the issue of whether dissenting shareholders have a right
to pursue alternative remedies under state law. Id. at 200-2. On remand, the Commission
reaffirmed the plan. 271 I.C.C. 667 (1949).
134. 334 U.S. at 198-9.
135. Id. at 199.
136. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 199.
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20b of the Interstate Commerce Act.1 38 Section 20b seeks to facilitate future
financing, and obviate the threat of § 77 bankruptcy reorganizations.'" Con-
gress established a simple non-judicial procedure for reaching these goals:
permission of the ICC and approval of 75 7 of each class of affected security
holders make a modification plan binding on all security holders
°.14  ICC
approval is contingent on its finding the plan in the "best interests" of each
class of affected bondholders and each class of stockholders, as well as "just
and reasonable."'1' The "best interests" test apparently requires that each
class of stockholders and affected bondholders bcnefit by the plan; "just and
reasonable," is the guide for securities allocations. 142 And using investment
value analysis, the ICC has shaped this allocation standard to § 20b procedures
and goals.
Lehigh Valley was the first plan under § 20b . 43 The road's capital struc-
ture largely consisted of seven bond classes and 1,200,000 shares of common
stock (par $50). $32,500,000 of bonded debt was due to mature within five
years of the plan's filing, and an additional $12,500,000 in the succeeding five
years. Moreover, in eleven of the past twenty years the road had failed to
earn fixed charges; and funds available for debt retirement were patently in-
adequate. The proposed plan extended impending maturities of five senior
bond issues and set up sinking funds for their retirement. While the maturity
date of the seventh issue ("general") was distant, the bulk of the road's fixed
138. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20b (Supp. 1951). For full discussions of 20b's
background and procedures consult: Hand & Cummings, Cowonsmal Securities Modifi-
cation, 63 HARv. L. RE:v. 957 (1950) ; Comment, Streamlined Capital Rcadjustment vndcr
Section 20b of the Interstate Commnerce Act, 58 YALE L. J. 1291, (1949) ; Note, Railroad
Modification Act 1948, 1 STAx. L. REv. 676 (1949); Hand & Cummings, The Rail-
road Modification Law, 48 Coi. L. REv. 689 (1948); Oliver, The Railroad Adiuatmcnt
Act, 15 I.C.C. PAc J. 527 (1948). See also, Blum, Investment Value Standard Under
Railroad Modification Act, 45 ILL. L. REV. 357 (1950).
The ICC was among 20b's strongest backers. See ICC, SLxrxnrH Axn'uAL, REro-.T
24-7 (1946).
139. See CoNGaEssioNAL DEci,.RAuox OF PuasEos oF Acr, following 49 U.S.G. § 2b
(13) (Supp. 1951).
140. §20b (2).
141. The ICC must also find that the proposed modifications will be "in the public
interest," within the scope of the statute and "will not be adverse to the interest of any
creditor of the carrier" not affected by such modifications. Ibid. See Salds v. United States,
Civil Action No. 763-51, D.D.C. p. 9, February 21, 1952.
142. The statutory wording of "just and reasonable" parallels § 5. See note 126 supra.
However, the ICC has interpreted the phrase as applying to more than just the "terms and
conditions" it attaches to § 20b applications; the whole modification plan must pass the test.
For discussion of "best interests" and "just and reasonable" see Hand & Cummings, Con-
sensual Securities Modification, 63 HALv. L. Rnv. 957, 968-74 (1950) ; Hand & Cummings,
Funding Arrearages Under Section 20b of the Interstate Comninerce Act, 65 HAMV. L. REv.
398, 402-16 (1952).
143. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553 (1949);
discussed in Hand & Cummings, Consensval Securities Modification, 63 HAnv. L. Rnv.
957, 959-61 (1950).
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charges resulted from these bonds. To lighten the burden of fixed charges, the
plan made three-fourths of "general's" interest contingent on earnings, cumula-
tive to three years. "General's" interest was payable only after the senior classes'
interest and sinking fund requirements were met. The plan compensated
"general" bondholders by giving them 4 shares of new no-par common for
each $1,000 bond. Old common was left with four fifths both of voting control
and the right to dividends-subject to debt retirement and "general's" interest
accumulations.
The "general" bondholders objected to the plan, contending that, while
common was participating, the proposed modifications failed to compensate
them fully for surrendered rights.144 In the Commission's view the plan was
to be considered "from the standpoint of the interests of the various classes
in a going business, with due regard, among other things, to their contract
rights and earnings possibilities."'145 Citing Otis, the ICC noted that § 20b
standards of compensation for surrendered rights "may differ" from those "in
a proceeding contemplating a liquidation of the carrier's property." 140 How-
ever, the ICC did amend the plan in "general's" favor: the cumulative interest
period was extended from three to five years and the mortgage trustee was
given the power to elect % of the directors if four years' interest accumulated.
With these amendments, the ICC found "general" bondholders "fully coin-
pensated for the rights surrendered."'1
47
In Lehigh Valley, as in ensuing § 20b cases, the ICC has measured alloca-
tion fairness by weighing old against proposed income claims.'48 Junior
bondholders often make the greatest sacrifices through plans rendering fixed-
interest claims contingent. 149 Allocation of stocks, creation of sinking funds,
and dividend restrictions are typical compensatory features. 150 The lien
analysis characteristic of § 77 reorganization is rare; only one plan, Maryland
& Pennsylvania,'5' altered the securing assets of bond classes. There, with
the value of assets which secured competing bond claims in issue, the ICC
without substantiating analysis of the § 77 type found the liens of equal
value. 52 Moreover, in at least one modification, New Jersey Central, junior
bondholders admittedly received less than full compensation. 1 8 But since this
144. 271 I.C.C. at 579.
145. Id. at 590.
146. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
148. E.g. Southern Railway Abandonment, 271 I.C.C. 605, 641 (1949) ; Maryland &
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 695, 712-13 (1950).
149. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553 (1949);
Maryland & Pennsylvania Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 695 (1950).
150. Southern Railway Co: Abandonment, 271 I.C.C. 605 (1949) illustrates the use
of all three techniques.
151. 275 I.C.C. 695 (1949).
152. Id. at 713, 716.
153. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 501, 523
(1949). Cf. Southern Railway Co. Abandonment, 271 I.C.C. 605 (1949).
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road was already in a § 77 reorganization proceeding, the ICC thought the
bondholders would benefit by a termination of that proceeding. 4 Moreover,
feasibility required common's participation: the controlling interest was owned
by the Reading Company-principal source of the road's traffic.15 Further
comparisons with probable § 77 results on similar facts are hard because § 20b
applicants, except in one case, have not valued the road's assets on a capital-
ized earnings basis.156
Maine Central 157 was the first of two § 20b plans dealing exclusively with
stock adjustments. The road's capital stock structure included three stock
classes: prior preference, preferred and common. Preferred's dividend rate
was 5% and its liquidation preference was par ($100) plus arrearages. Since
it had received no dividends since 1931, arrearages totaled $85 per share.
However, operating revenues had increased almost steadily, and 1948 earnings
amounted to 2Y times 1938 revenues. Moreover, the road had a substantial
surplus when the petition was filed. The plan aimed to make recent and future
earnings available for common dividends by eliminating preferred arrearages,
raising preferred's par from $100 to $185. Further, the dividend rate
was to be diminished from 5% to 4%. As a result of these changes all stocks
would be on a current dividend basis. According to the road, this streamlining
would improve the carrier's credit position, and thereby facilitate future fin-
ancing.
15s
Preferred holders objected and the ICC disapproved the plan. 163 The road
employed investment value analysis to demonstrate that, even on its estimate
of future earnings, preferred would actually benefit from the plan: the right
to receive 4% on $185 in perpetuum was deemed more valuable than the
rights to 5 % on $100 plus payment of the $85 arrearages. 160 And if preferred's
more optimistic earnings estimate were accepted. preferred's benefit would be
all the greater.1 61 The seductive appeal of this analysis convinced neither
preferred holders nor the ICC.1'0 2 The Commission found that there would
probably be sufficient earnings to pay current preferred dividends and to
154. 271 I.C.C. at 524.
155. Id. at 513, 517. The plan would allow the road the "continued benefit from
traffic relation with its affiliate." Id. at 524.
156. The exception is Boston and Maine Railroad Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C.
397 (1950).
157. Maine Central Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 275 LC.C. 261 (1950). The
plan is discussed in Hand & Cummings, Funding Arrcarages Under Scclion 20b of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 65 HAv. L REv. 393 (1952).
158. 275 I.C.C. at 266-7.
159. Perhaps a significant reason for the ICC's action was the opposition of a pre-
ferred stockholders' protective committee representing about 50% of the outstanding issue.
Ibid. At the time of the ICC hearing, the road's directors owned 40.1% of oustanding
common. Id. at 288.
160. Id. at 273.
161. Id. at 273-4.
162. See note 159 stpra.
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apply annually $2.40 per share to pay off arrearages. At this rate, arrearages
would be paid off in 31 years. Thus, the Commission concluded, there was
no necessity for a plan which sacrificed preferred's priority to $85 in arrear-
ages, but contemplated no sacrifices by common. As a result, the plan was
held not in the "best interests" of preferred.1 63
Despite its disapproval on "best interests" grounds, the ICC sanctioned the
road's use of investment value analysis to measure preferred's claim. The
Commission noted that preferred holders under § 20b were entitled only to the
equivalent of the present investment value of their contract on a going concern
basis.16 In computing that value, past yields, market value, and future income
prospects were all relevant factors.'0 5 Therefore, in the present case, pre-
ferred had no right to receive money or property worth $85 to compensate
for surrender of the arrearage claim.' 60
Investment analysis of shareholders' claims fully blossomed in the Boston
& Maine plan.1 7 That road applied under § 20b to simplify its complicated
capital structure, and thus improve marketability of its securities. The stock
structure consisted of: (1) cumulative prior preference preferred; (2) five
series of cumulative first preferred; (3) non-cumulative preferred; and (4)
common. The liquidation preference of the two senior stocks was par ($100)
plus arrearages. And arrearages had already mounted to $119 per prior
preference share and from $86.25 to $172.50 per share of the five series of first
preferred. The plan contemplated two new stocks: cumulative-when-earned
preferred and common, both at $100 par. The total par of the proposed stock
would be $22 million less than the old. Valuation of the road based on
capitalized future earnings required the reduction.
The petitioning road computed the number of years which would have been
necessary under the old capital structure to pay off arrearages and place all
the stocks on a current dividend basis. The computation assumed that all
available estimated income, $4,370,831, would be used to meet current divi-
dend requirements and pay off arrearages. On the basis of these assumptions,
the road estimated that 17 years would be required to pay off prior preferred's
arrearages. This arrearage claim, discounted to present worth, was valued
163. 275 I.C.C. at 283. The Commission seems to have used "just and reasonable"
language despite the "best interest" label.
164. Id. at 271-2.
165. The Commission, however, felt little weight could be given past yields and present
market values in this case, "since the former have been controlled by the common-stock
holders through ... [the road's] board of directors and the latter are based on the judg-
ment of the market as to the probability of the ... proposal being approved." Id. at 281.
166. Id. at 272.
167. Boston and Maine Railroad Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 397 (1950), aff'd,
Sakis v. United States, Civil Action No. 763-51, D.D.C., February 21, 1952. The district
court opinion is paraphrased in 20 U.S.L. WEEK 2389 (March 4,1952). The plan is discussed
in Hand & Cummings, Funding Arrearages Under Section 20b of the Interstate Conmnerce
Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 398 (1952).
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at $78.91. Further, the road computed the investment value of prior pre-
ferred's principal claim of 7% on $100. The road considered $100 invested
at 7% equal in value to $140 at 5%o (new preferred's dividend rate). But
the ceiling on newly authorized preferred permitted each prior preference
share to receive only $120 in new preferred. The balance of prior preferred's
principal claim-5 % of 20-was paid in new common. As a result, one new
share of common (par $100) was issued to each prior preference share to
cover both the remaining principal claim and the arrearage claim of $78.91.16s
Although par value of 1.2 shares of new preferred and 1 share of new common
equaled par value of the prior preference, the old shareholders' earnings
priority was reduced $1 per share.
The road then attempted to use the investment value approach to measure
first-preferred's claim. But here the plan hit a snag. Allotments to first pre-
ferred on the basis of investment value would have consumed all remaining
authorized common, thereby eliminating both junior stocks.IcO With no
dividend prospects for at least 74 years, the road admitted that junior stock
claims "defy value analysis."' 0  But on an "arbitrary judgment basis" the
road allotted small portions of new common to the non-cumulative preferred
and common.' 7' The need for such allocation was obvious: junior share-
holders "could not be expected to vote themselves out of existence."172 The
ICC amended the plan by slightly altering allocation among the different
series of first-preferred. Emphasis on relative market values produced the
change.' 73 The ICC then upheld all the allocations as "just and reasonable."
In fact, by reasoning that the road contemplated ultimate payment of all ar-
rearages and retirement of debt, the Commission found that the two junior
stocks had a "legitimate, though small, investment value." To hold otherwise
would "give undue weight" to liquidation rights.174 It then cited Otis.
In Sakis v. United States,17a first-preferred holders challenged the fairness
of the Boston & Maine plan as well as § 20b's constitutionality. Relying on
Otis and Central-171inois, a three-judge district court upheld the ICC's invest-
ment value approach to claims measurement. Specifically, the court sanctioned
reliance on claims to future earnings as the prime measure of the investment
contract's value. Since there was sufficient evidence in the record to support
the Commission's finding that the plan was in the "best interests" of affected
security holders and "just and reasonable," the court upheld the modification
plan. Also rejected was plaintiff's claims that § 20b violated due process by
168. The road's elaborate analysis is spelled out in the opinion. 275 I.C.C. at 426 n. 25.
169. Id. at 450.
170. Id. at 428.
171. Ibid.
172. Id. at 429.
173. Id. at 450.
174. Ibid.
175. Civil Action No. 763-51, D.D.C., February 21, 1952. The opinion is para-
phrased in 20 U.S.L. WEEK 23S9 (March 4, 1952).
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permitting 759o% of a class of security holders to deprive the remaining 25%
of their contract rights. The court reasoned that: "If contract rights stand in
the way of the exercise by Congress of a power within its competence under
the Constitution, the contract right must fall,' 71 0 and held § 20b a legitimate
exercise of Congress' power to regulate railroad transportation. The contract
alterations on the basis of present values were not deemed a capricious exercise
of delegated power.
17 7
In tailoring securities allocation to meet § 20b procedural and policy require-
ments, the ICC has relied heavily on the flexibility of investment value anlysis.
In Boston & Maine, for example, the Commission cited the junior share-
holders' loss of voting rights to justify their participation' 71-despite the fact
that they had no reasonable dividend expectations for the next 74 years. In
effect, the ICC seconded the road's admission that junior shareholders'
power to block modification must be rewarded. The consensual nature of § 20b
modifications probably demands this departure from standards of other re-
organization statutes. New Jersey Central produced another § 20b innovation-
permitting junior interests to participate although seniors admittedly were not
fully compensated. Not only § 20b procedure but feasibility required this
result: the road's principal customer owned the bulk of common. While
Sakis upheld the validity of investment value alterations of stock contracts,
the constitutionality of a New Jersey Central type of § 20b plan, allowing
junior participation when senior interests are not fully compensated, is yet
to be ruled on by the courts.
. EVALUATON AND CONCLUSION
In all reorganization contexts bondholder claims are measured alike. Since
earnings potential is the primary gauge of economic worth, investment value
analysis of bonds stresses the worth of old income rights to guide allocation
of new securities. Comm uity Light & Power under the Holding Company
Act is probably the best example: the plan's allotment of no-par common to
debenture holders 'was justified because the stocks' prospective yield fully
compensated them for relinquishing their fixed interest claim.
When competing bond classes are secured by separate assets, the earnings
potential of these underlying assets is analyzed to value surrendered income
claims. True, divisional-earnings examination may merely value securing
assets to measure a bond's intrinsic worth; but courts, preoccupied with earn-
ings coverage, apparently seek to measure the relative value of competing in-
come claims. This phase of investment value analysis of bond contracts is
176. Civil Action No. 763-51, D.D.C., p. 28.
177. Id. at 29.
178. 275 I.C.C. at 428-9.
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illustrated by Chicgo, Milwauke, St. Paul & Pacific's insistence on divisional
earnings to determine allocation and Missouri Pacific's compensation of a
prosperous subsidiary's bonds.
But investment value analysis supplements rather than supplants face
amounts as a measure of bondholder claims. Theoretically, a $500 bond bear-
ing 15% with a 1995 maturity date would of course more than compensate a
$1,000 bond bearing 2% with the same maturity date. But high fixed charges
are the nemesis of corporations with fluctuating incomes; railroads are the
classic example. In the interests of "feasibility," therefore, reorganizers do
not raise interest ratesY.79 Instead, they preserve face claims, including accrued
interest and principal, whether matured, naturally or by an acceleration clause,
or with distant maturity date. But investment value analysis goes beyond this
face claim to measure the other contract rights surrendered. Of these, earnings
rights are most important. And within limits set by "feasibility," compensation
for more valuable rights is made in either choicer new securities of the same
face value or a larger quantity of securities with an inferior income claim, or
both. This investment value analysis in fact is the "bundle of rights" approach
of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific.
In contrast to uniformly applied bond measurement criteria, yardsticks for
measurement of stockholder claims vary with reorganization settings. To
measure "the claim" of preferred holders, in Chapter X and perhaps § 77
proceedings as well, lower courts consider preferred stock liquidation claims
matured, directly analogous to Los Angcles Lumber's maturation of bond-
holders' principal. But under the Holding Company Act and §§ 5 and 20b of
the Interstate Commerce Act, measurement of preferred shareholders' claims
markedly differs. In these procedures the key to "the claim" that must be "fully
compensated" is a current estimate of preferreds' claim to prospective earn-
ings; "unmatured" liquidation rights are only one factor in the computations,
and a minor one at that. Clearly, this investment value analysis of preferreds'
claims has permitted junior participation when a valuation of the claim dom-
inated preferred liquidation rights would have wiped them out. Unique
pressures, policies, and procedures have nurtured the development of this
analysis.
However, neither branding the yardstick "expedient" nor the contention
that preferred shareholders would receive 2nore under a "liquidation" stand-
ard resolves the basic problem: Which gauge corresponds more with the reali-
ties of corporate reorganizations and Boyd's cannon of "full compensation?"
Liquidation is rarely a practical alternative to reorganization. Certainly, rail-
roads and public utilities cannot liquidate; the specialized nature of their
fixed assets and the public interest demands their continued operation. And
179. One § 20b plan furnishes a rare exception to this practice: the interest rate on
one bond class was raised from 4% to 4 %, thereby increasing fixed charges by about
$25,000 yearly. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C.
369 (1950).
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buyers with sufficient capital are unwilling to purchase decrepit roads outright.
Similarly, other mass corporations whose going concern value exceeds liqui-
dation value will reorganize.180 Thus, not only are liquidation rights literally
inapplicable but reorganization is not a functional equivalent to liquidation in-
voking primary reliance on liquidation rights.181 In practice, "absolute pri-
ority" could not mark face or liquidation claims the sole or even primary
measure of "the claim" that must be "fully compensated." Obviously, a 79%
non-cumulative preferred share with a $100 liquidation claim is worth more
than 5 % preferred with equivalent features. Valuing all rights in the contract,
rather than focusing on the liquidation right, directly implements Boyd's
policy of "full compensation" for surrendered rights.
Investment value analysis should apply to stocks and bonds with equal force.
Cases under the Holding Company Act and §§ 5 and 20b of the Interstate
Commerce Act illustrate how investment value analysis might be applied to
stocks in Chapter X and § 77 reorganizations. Investment value analysis of
this type could be as easily applied to bonds. For example, the claim of a 5 %
perpetual income bond with a liquidation right to $100 plus arrearages can be
measured identically with a preferred shareholder's analogous claim.' "
Paralleling the treatment of preferreds' liquidation rights under the Holding
Company Act, reorganization should not mature non-accelerated bond prin-
cipal; the bond's right to a fixed sum at some future date, however, should
enhance the value of the bondholder's claim.18 3 Since the average security
holder in a mass capital corporation regards himself as an investor-not a
creditor or aliquot owner-consistent investment value analysis probably ac-
cords with investor expectations.
Statutory allocation standards, moreover, do not impede expansion of in-
vestment value analysis. Simplifications under the Holding Company Act are
governed by "fair and equitable"; but expediting the holding company over-
haul required a departure from practices apparently prevailing under "fair
and equitable" in Chapter X and § 77. Claims measurement under the con-
sensual procedures of §§ 5 and 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act, though
nominally governed by a "just and reasonable" standard, parallel the Holding
Company Act approach. In short, claims measurement and resultant alloca-
180. See First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504 (1934).
181. For a recent exposition of this view see Billyou, supra note 32.
182. For an illustration of fully compensatory treatment of perpetual bonds under
§20b, see Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553 (1949).
Perpetual 6% consolidated bonds were given a maturity date and made redeemable; to
compensate for possible loss of the choice 6% interest rate the redemption price was set
at $120.
183. The maturity dates of competing bond classes will also affect apportionments be-
tween them. To illustrate: Reorganization in an expanding economy when investment
alternatives are yielding 6% means that a matured $1,000 bond bearing 4% is more
valuable than an unmatured $1,000 bond bearing 4% with a maturity date 10 years distant.
Conversely, in depression years, the unmatured bond may be more valuable.
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tions are moulded by specific reorganization contexts: the verbal standard-
"fair and equitable" or "just and reasonable"--does not itself define factual
criteria.184
While investment value analysis theoretically harmonizes with "full com-
pensation," its inherent flexibility may frustrate "absolute priority." The gen-
eralities of investment value analysis necessitate broad discretionary powers.
Since courts accord great weight to the "informed discretion" of the SEC
and ICC, judicial seconding of their approved plans is virtually guaranteed.28s
The Boston & Maine case is a perfect example of "stretched" investment
value findings to ensure court approval. While the SEC may sometimes have
been over-generous to common stockholders under the Holding Company
Act, s6 the Act's non-consensual procedures probably would have resulted in
SEC erasure of the two Boston & Maine junior stocks. Boston & Maine, in
effect, rewarded the junior shareholders for their nuisance value, in sharp
contrast to Los Angeles Lumber's specific repudiation of nuisance value as a
basis for shareholder participation in Chapter X reorganizations. 187 The New
Jersey Central type of plan, where juniors participate though seniors were
admittedly not fully compensated, is a further consequence of a wholly con-
sensual procedure. 8 8 Thus, cheap and rapid reorganization procedures of the
§ 20b type may necessarily sacrifice fully compensatory treatment for senior
claimants. In fact, § 20b plans may revert to the products of loose "equity
receiverships" in pre-§ 77 days, with the ICC in the role of the "friendly
receiver." Investment value, in sum, can foster or frustrate Boyd's canon of
full compensation for surrendered rights and junior exclusion when seniors are
not fully compensated; agency discretion and reorganization procedures will
decide.
184. For a discussion of the pervasive influence of Boyd, see Rostow & Cutler, supra
note 2, at 1346-52.
185. See SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 115-27 (1949);
Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336, 346-7 (1951); Sakis v. United
States, Civil Action No. 763-51, D.D.C., February 21, 1952, paraphrased in 20 U.S.L WEEV
2389 (March 4, 1952). Illustrative of the consequences of failure to make proper "findings"
is the Chicago, Milwaukee. St. Paul & Pacific plan: the Supreme Court reversed. See text
at pp. 664-5 supra.
For recent criticism of the manner in which the ICC has exercised discretionary
powers in other areas of railroad interest, see Huntington, The Marasnus Of The ICC:
The Commission, The Railroads, And The Public Interest, 61 YALE L. J. 467 (1952).
186. See notes 120 and 123 supra and text.
187. See note 20 supra.
188. True, dividend restrictions barred diversion of income from bondholders to
shareholders; but the plan left old common holders with voting control although they had
no equity left in the business.
Appropriate amendment of § 20b could avoid such plans and yet foster capital readjust-
ments without § 77 reorganizations. For example, once a road petitions for modification
under § 20b, its withdrawal without ICC consent could be barred. And if a security is
found to be valueless, its holders could be deprived of voting rights in plan approval.
19521
